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Introduction
The literature on International Relations has largely considered
North America as a region formed by Canada and the United
States, in spite of the fact that from the geographical
perspective
Mexico
is
also
part
of
the
region.
The
acknowledgement of Mexico as part of North America is derived
from the implementation of NAFTA and the attempt of scholars and
decision makers to create a more efficient region.
The
expectation of a North American Community was based on the
assumption
that
increasing
economic
interdependence
would
stimulate the conception of regional institutions and eventually
the spillover onto other areas of the trilateral agenda. While
the ideas of deeper regional cooperation floated in the air of
the three countries, the analysis of regionalism in North
America indicates that economic integration remains at the lower
level of the Balasian integration (free trade) and the spillover
effects have not taken place. In the area of security, threats
to stability such as terrorism and organized crime have produced
the reinforcement of the bi-lateralization rather than the trilateralization. In this regard, this chapter explores the
reasons why the North American partners are facing obstacles to
develop deeper cooperation in the area of security from a
regional perspective. By adopting a Wendtian approach, this
chapter argues that in the area of security, a cooperative
system has emerged in the US-Canadian relationship while the USMexican relationship remains anchored in the logic of an
individualistic system. The chapter starts with the overview of
the theoretical approach to study security in North America,
followed by the analysis of ideas, perceptions, principles and
policies in the security of North America.
The Fragmented Region: Individualistic and Cooperative Systems
The study of security in North America has been explored from
different theoretical perspectives derived from the study of
security in Europe and the transatlantic community. Drawing on
such approaches, North America has been defined as a pluralistic
security community (Gonzalez and Haggard 1998) in the sense that
in North America there are no prospects of conflicts escalating
to the use of force among the three countries. From a different
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angle, Bow (2010) has argued that to some extent North America
has developed some features of a security complex as envisioned
by Buzan, namely, a cluster of states which must take one
another into account when thinking about their national
security. While these approaches have contributed to the
understanding of security in North America, they have provided a
limited explanatory power due to the characteristics of the
region; unlike the European Union or NATO, North America has
opted for bilateral strategies to deal with threats and avoided
trilateral institutions with collective decision-making power.
This trend has been identified as dual-bilateralism (Pastor
2008).
As it will be developed below, the performance of the region
reflects two different security systems. Based on the seminal
conceptualization of Alexander Wendt (1992) on security systems,
security differs “in the extent to which and the manner in which
the self is identified cognitively with the other,” paving the
way to competitive, individualistic and cooperative systems. Two
systems prevail in North America. By adapting the model of
Wendt, the cooperation between the United States and Canada
resembles the cooperative security system in which states
identify positively with one another and the parties are able to
share and build common institutions, and security of each is
perceived as the responsibility of all. On the other hand, the
security relationship between the United States and Mexico as
well as Canada and Mexico is guided by the rationale of an
individualist security system, in which states are ambiguous in
the identification with one another, cooperation is limited as a
result of distrust and security is perceived as an individual
responsibility. The remainder of the paper will address why the
three countries have prioritized bilateral cooperation rather
than regional cooperation by looking at perceptions, principles
and policies in the area of security cooperation. The argument
is that, following Wendt, countries can change and form a
security system when a transformative process occurs on three
different levels: breakdown of consensus, critical examination
and new practices. In North America, there is no evidence of
breakdown of consensus of the status quo of the security system
at the trilateral level, neither between the US or Canada with
Mexico, while Canada and the United States were able to develop
a cooperative system during the Cold War. These ideas will be
explored below.
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Ideas and Perceptions
Several scholars have argued that ideas are fundamental to
change the orientation of security institutions (Ned Lebow and
Groos Stein 1994; Wendt 1991). The idea for a security community
for North America has been posed to the regional audience in a
wave that lasted from mid-1990s to 2005-6. While think tanks and
scholars embraced the viability of the regional community, the
governments
and
elites
responded
cautiously
and
unenthusiastically. All in all, the debate in North America has
paved the way to the creation of two groups based on the scope
of the regional community from a minimalist approach, namely,
proposing a superficial adaptation of NAFTA limited to the
United States and Canada, to a maximalist mode suggesting a
European Union like entity, or a combination of both (Dominguez
2005, 28).
A) Ideas for a North American Community
In Mexico, for many years, the idea of a North American
community was rejected due to the economic disparities between
Mexico and the United States and the nationalistic approach of
the Mexican foreign policy. In the 1970s, the US government put
forward the idea of a North America Common Market; but the
Mexican government and the society discarded the proposal since
Mexico was embarked in an import-substitution model and was not
interested in an open market. However, the idea toward an
economic integration with the United States was shaped after the
financial crisis at the beginning of the 1980s. Then, the
Mexican government was willing to open up foreign trade to
reduce the effects of the crisis and promote economic
development. The Carlos Salinas administration (1988-1994) then
accepted the idea of economic integration with North America and
signed NAFTA in 1992. As can be seen, Mexico was willing to
create a North American community but only in trade and
financial terms. The idea of a North American community in
security matters was not considered due to the nationalistic
approach of Mexican foreign policy and the Mexican governments
distrust towards US authorities.1 In the economic sphere, some
authors have proposed the development of a North American Common
Market that can include free movement of people, goods,
1

In Mexico, both government and society distrust U.S. authorities because
they consider that, in some occasions, Washington has meddled in Mexico’s
domestic affairs in security matters.
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investments and services (Flores and Novelo, 2010), but ideas of
a security community in the region are unusual.
When President Vicente Fox came to power in 2000, he was willing
to deepen the North America integration process to include free
movement of people and the creation of development funds, as it
has been done in the European Union. But security was not
included in the package. The Fox administration also put forward
an immigration agreement between Mexico and the US to regulate
the legal status of Mexican migrants. This proposal was known as
the NAFTA-plus. However, the idea did not reverberate in the
United States and Canada. After the 9-11 attacks, Vicente Fox
was disposed to cooperate with the United States in its war
against international terrorism. But he did not support
President Bush in his initiative to launch a United Nations (UN)
attack to Iraq in 2003. By that time, Mexico was part of the UN
Security Council, and was not willing to vote in favor of the
attack
due
to
the
Mexican
foreign
policy
tenets
(Non
Intervention
and
Peaceful
Resolution
on
International
Controversies) and because the mid-term federal elections were
too close. Vicente Fox and his rightist party would have lost
votes if he backed up the US intervention in Iraq. This position
brought resentment in the Bush administration against Mexico and
hampered the possibilities of the construction of a security
community after 9-11. However, the bilateral differences were
resolved in 2005 when Mexico, the United States and Canada
signed the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) to
guarantee security cooperation in North America. But the SPP
failed due to the lack of interests and incentives when new
administrations came into power in Mexico and the United States.
President Barack Obama did not show too much interest in the SPP
and President Felipe Calderon did not have among his priorities
the creation of a security community in North America.
Calderon’s interests focused on the war against drug trafficking
and organized crime and he preferred a bilateral approach
through the Merida Initiative, which is a mechanism between
Mexico and the United States to cooperate in those issues.
Therefore, the idea of a trilateral security community has not
been well developed in Mexico in the last years.
In Canada, the debate on the future of North America was
triggered by the Big Idea, which was proposed by Wendy Dobson
(2002). She argues that Canada and Mexico should facilitate U.S
security goals, and in return the United States should commit to
maintaining open borders even in the aftermath of an attack.
Specifically, she recommends the consideration of a “strategic
4
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bargain,” a “pragmatic mix of customs-union-like and common
market-like proposals plus Canadian initiatives” in areas of
strength that are of particular interests for Americans. In the
case of the U.S.-Canadian security relationship, Dobson proposed
the following: a) investing in the border in order to have a
more secure border with fewer obstacles; b) mutual recognition
of the security of immigration from third countries; c) energy
as part of bilateral security; and d) more active role for
Canada on bilateral military defense. Likewise, she suggests
Canadians should proceed bilaterally but be open to including
Mexico when it makes sense. Contrary to Dobson, Charles Barnett
and Hugh Williams (2003) rejected the Big Idea approach. They
suggest that engaging in high-profile bilateral negotiations may
well be a disadvantage for the weaker state, Canada. They urge
bilateral process where the issues are addressed in an
incremental and pragmatic manner. In this regard, they summarize
their approach by focusing on the following areas: a) expanding
successful approaches, such as the Smart Border Declaration; b)
encouraging security cooperation; c) working towards a common
external
tariff;
and
d)
identifying
mutual
interest
in
international trade negotiations. Along the same lines, in 2003
the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) presented a
strategy for advancing the Canadian-United States relationship.
This strategy, entitled “Security and Prosperity: The Dynamics
of a New Canada-United States Partnership in North America” or
“Treaty of North America,” is based on five interlocking
pillars:
reinventing
the
border;
maximizing
economic
efficiencies;
building
on
resource
security;
sharing
in
continental and global security; and developing new institutions
for managing the bilateral relationship (d’Aquino 2003).
Contrary to minimalist approaches to integration in North
America, in a very comprehensive proposal, Robert Pastor (2001)
presents the North American Community. Considering the pros and
cons of European integration, the North American Community would
emphasize institutional development at the regional level as
well as the creation of compensatory mechanisms to reduce the
gap between Mexico and its two NAFTA partners. In this regard,
three institutions could be created. Unlike the European
Commission, a North American Commission should be “lean and
advisory, made up of just 15 distinguished individuals, five
from each country.” Likewise, a single North American InterParliamentary
Group
would
merge
the
bilateral
interparliamentary groups with a problem solving approach. The third
institution would be a Permanent Court on Trade and Investment,
which would “permit the accumulation of precedent.” Along with
5
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these institutions, a North American Customs Union and a North
American Customs and Immigration Force would contribute to
enhance trade exchanges and security. Perhaps one of the most
important features of this proposal is the North American
Investment Fund that would invest $200 billion in infrastructure
over the next decade on the condition that Mexico increases its
tax revenues from 11 to 16 percent of its GDP.
B) Perceptions of Threats
Perceptions of threats are one of the main variables that form
security policies. The information available from the public
opinion surveys of the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations from
2004 to 2010 indicates that two threats have been permanently
ranked among the five top places within the United States:
international terrorism and the possibility of unfriendly
countries becoming nuclear powers. The US dependence on foreign
oil/disruption of energy supply was ranked among the top five
priorities in 2006, 2008 and 2010, while violent Islamist groups
in Pakistan and Afghanistan was salient in 2008 and 2010 and
Iran’s nuclear program was included as the third threat in 2010.
While the main perceptions of threats in the United States stem
from global sources and hence reflect the global role of the
United States, two critical threats related to the North
American region and more precisely to Mexico have also been
included in the survey: drug-related violence and instability in
Mexico was ranked eleventh in 2010 and large numbers of
immigrants and refugees coming into the US was ranked fifth in
2004, fourth in 2006 and sixth in 2008.
In the case of Mexico, according to the “Mexico, the Americas,
and the World 2010” survey, the main threats for national
security are drug-trafficking and organized crime, which ranked
as the number 1 threat in 2010, with 82% of respondents
identifying them as a ‘grave threat’ (Gonzalez, 2011, p. 59).
This perception has been consistent over the four editions of
the survey (2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010): In 2004, ‘Drug
Trafficking’ was ranked as the number 1 threat (89%); in 2006,
‘Drug Trafficking’ was once again ranked number 1 (93%); in
2008, ‘Drug-trafficking and organized crime’ was ranked number 1
(79%). Therefore, Mexicans perceive domestic issues as the
greatest threats rather than global problems. Thus, Mexicans are
more concerned over issues that affect daily life. As for global
menaces, Mexicans rank weapons trafficking (76% - rank 5 in
2010), nuclear weapons (72% - rank 8 in 2010) and international
6
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terrorism (72% - rank 8 in 2010) as an intermediate threat. In a
regional context, Mexicans are less worried about border
conflicts (rank 11 in 2010), territorial disputes (rank 11 in
2010), and instability in neighboring countries (rank 12 in
2010).
In the case of Canada, five issues have been the most important
during the period 1993-2010. In 2010 the ranking was the
following: environment (16%); starvation (16%); war (14%);
economy (14%); and terrorism (6%). (Environics Institute 2010).
According to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute,
public perceptions have changed greatly regarding threats to the
vital interests of Canada. “Climate change now dominates the
agenda, while terrorism and potential epidemics have almost
disappeared from Canadians’ radar screen” (Canadian Defence and
Foreign Affairs Institute, 2010). Roughly 50% of Canadians deem
that climate change is a critical threat to the vital interests
of the country in the next 10 years (49% in 2010 vs. 52% in
2004). Therefore, climate change has become the most important
threat in the views of Canadians. On the other hand, almost a
quarter of Canadian public (28% in 2010 vs. 49% in 2004) now
consider international terrorism as a vital threat, which
represents a figure below the one registered in 2004. In the
case of migration, the concern over the number of immigrants and
refugees has grown since 2004 (27% in 2010 vs. 21% in 2004).
As it can be observed, there is a significant difference in
perceptions among the three countries in North America: Mexicans
perceived organized crime as the main threat, the United States
reflects its threats as result of their global role, while
Canadians are focused on more soft security issues, such as
climate change. This difference in perceptions makes it more
difficult to construct a security community in the North
American region. The United States government and society are
more interested in international terrorism and global threats.
Therefore, they would push for deeper security schemes in the
region. Mexico and Canada would resist creating a security
community based exclusively in global “hard” security issues and
would press to include “soft” and local security issues, such as
organized crime and climate change. A trilateral negotiation
among the three countries would be highly difficult and to reach
a consensus on security issues in the region would be equally
complicated.

7

Roberto Domínguez and Rafael Velázquez
Principles of action
The perceptions of security priorities in the three countries
correspond to the principles enacted in the guiding documents on
security.
In the case of the United States, the evaluation of
the US strategies towards Mexico and Canada entail two distinct
approaches. The 2010 National Security Strategy identifies
weapons of mass destruction and far-reaching networks of hatred
and violence, and hence terrorism, as the main threats for the
United States. While the NSC identifies North America as a
region and advocates to “change the way we think about our
shared borders, in order to secure and expedite the lawful and
legitimate
flow
of
people
and
goods
while
interdicting
transnational threat that threaten our open societies” (47), the
document continues and differentiates the approach of security
to both neighboring countries: “With Canada, our security
cooperation includes our defense of North America and our
efforts through NATO overseas… With Mexico, in addition to trade
cooperation, we are working together to identify and interdict
threats at the earliest opportunity, even before they reach
North
America.
Stability
and
security
in
Mexico
are
indispensable to building a strong economic partnership,
fighting the illicit drug and arms trade, and promoting sound
immigration policy” (White House 2010, 47).
Another fundamental document that enshrines the differentiation
of Mexico and Canada in the perspective of the United States is
the 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime:
Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. While there
are no specific references to North America, Canada is mentioned
within the actions of sharing of criminal intelligence and
enhanced cooperation with groups such as the “Quintet of
Attorneys-General”
and
the
“Strategic
Alliance
Group”
established with the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and
Australia. However, the approach to Mexico is quite different.
First and foremost, the document underscores the historic
campaign of the Mexican Government against transnational crime
organizations. Later, the Strategy acknowledges that indeed the
demand for illicit drugs, both in the United States and abroad,
fuels
the
power,
impunity,
and
violence
of
criminal
organizations around the globe and that Mexican DTOs are
escalating their violence to consolidate their market share
within the Western Hemisphere, protect their operations in
Mexico, and expand their reach into the United States. It also
describes the links between criminal networks and illicit arms
dealers and the fact that the US Federal law enforcement
8
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agencies have intercepted large numbers of weapons or related
items being smuggled to China, Russia, Mexico, the Philippines,
Somalia, Turkmenistan, and Yemen in 2010 alone. Finally, the
document states that TOC in Mexico makes the U.S. border more
vulnerable because it creates and maintains illicit corridors
for border crossings that can be employed by other secondary
criminal or terrorist actors or organizations.
In a review of the Mexican national security strategies, there
are two important official documents: The Plan Nacional de
Desarrollo (National Development Plan [NDP]) and the Programa
Nacional de Seguridad Pública 2008-2012 (National Program of
Public Security 2008-2012 [NPPS]). In this case, the government
strategy also corresponds to the perception of the Mexican
public opinion. That is, Mexican authorities focuses on domestic
issues rather than regional or global matters. Both the NDP and
the NPPS have a nationalistic perspective. For example, the NPPS
does not even mention the region of North America, nor the
United States or Canada. According to this document, Mexico’s
national security policy is based on the following goals: to
prevent criminal activities, to openly combat crime, to
consolidate the rule of law, to improve technology to fight
against organized crime, to professionalize police corporations,
and to reform the institutions in charge in combating crime. The
NDP emphasizes the same goals, but it includes international
cooperation in the security policy. The document establishes
that the Mexican government has to promote international
cooperation to face organized crime, but this has to be carried
out under the principles of “defense of sovereignty, territorial
integrity and legal equality of States.” The NDP neither refers
to North America as a region, nor does it establish particular
strategies towards Canada or the United States. Therefore, the
NDP does not consider Mexico as part of the North American
region. It only mentions the northern neighbor when setting
goals and strategies on border matters, particularly in the
exchange of information for border security. As can be seen,
Mexico’s policy against potential threats is based on a local
vision and does not emphasize regional cooperation.
In the case of Canada, a report titled Securing an Open Society:
Canada's National Security Policy was released in 2004 and
served as the “first-ever policy of its kind” (Public Safety
Canada 2011) to outline Canada’s core national security
interests and design a plan to face the security threats deemed
most serious. The report was reassessed in 2005 through the
publishing of Securing an Open Society: One Year Later, where
9
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the government of Canada reinforced the notion that the
country’s security policy revolves around three core interests:
protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians;
ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to its allies; and
contributing to international security (Privy Council Office
2004).
The report, which enshrines Canada’s National Security Policy,
has focused on six key areas: intelligence, emergency planning,
public health emergencies, transportation security, border
security and international security. While the first four of
these priorities are of a mostly domestic nature, border
security and international security are priorities that relate
to Canada’s role in the regional and international arena. With
regards to border security, the Canadian government highlights
the importance of Canada-US border programs, such as the Smart
Border Declaration and the Free and Secure Trade program (FAST).
The report expresses the country’s interest in developing a
next-generation borders agenda with both Mexico and the US,
building on the success of the Smart Border Declaration.
Conversely, Canada shies away from its regional neighbors in the
international
security
arena,
where
it
highlights
its
participation in the UN and NATO. Regarding international
security, the highest priority is placed on three key points:
international terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction; and failed and failing states and intra- and
interstate conflict. In its 2005 update report, Canada named as
one of its priorities the revitalization of its North American
partnership with Mexico and the United States “by enhancing
security and promoting prosperity” (Privy Council Office 2005,
48). It set out to work together to establish “a common approach
to security to protect North America from external threats,
prevent and respond to threats within North America, and further
streamline the secure and efficient movement of legitimate, lowrisk traffic across our shared borders” (49).
Policies
Perceptions and principles aim to be transformed into policies
that influence the behavior of the actors. The security policies
of cooperation have been focused on two main areas: military and
border policies.
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A) United States-Canada
Security military cooperation between the United States and
Canada can be traced back to the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) in 1957, which is located in Colorado
Springs. The NORAD commander is chosen by and is responsible to
the Canadian Prime Minister and the US President.
As a result
of the 9-11 attacks, NORAD was incorporated in the US Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) mission to dissuade, prevent and confront
threats directed to the United States. The cooperation between
NORAD and NORTHCOM has in fact provided the incentives for
closer military cooperation between both countries to protect
not only the air, but also the coastal and territorial space
(Hristoulas 2010). Canada also deployed military presence in
Afghanistan alongside the US and other NATO troops.
With regard to border cooperation, after the 9/11 events, the
United States and Canada negotiated a formula to maintain the
intensive trade exchange and also to protect the border. On 12
December 2001, both countries signed the 32-point Smart Border
Declaration. The cooperation has evolved in a more constructive
way and both countries created the Integrated Border Enforcement
Team (IBET), which consists of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, the Canada Border Services Agency, the US Border Patrol,
the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the US Coast
Guard. As of February 2012, there were 24 IBET units that play a
critical role in maintaining the integrity and security of
bilateral
borders
by
assisting
in
national
security
investigations and combating organized crime and other criminal
activity. On several occasions, the RCMP and the US Coast Guard
have collaborated on a special marine security project known as
“Shiprider,” targeting cross-border criminal activity on our
shared waters. The Shiprider pilots were a tremendous success
and negotiations are underway to create a permanent Shiprider
program (RCMP 2010)
B) United States-Mexico
In the case of military cooperation between Mexico and the
United States, the former has been quite reluctant to cooperate
in order to preserve national sovereignty.
The Merida
Initiative (MI) was a turning point, because for the first time
the US provided military and police assistance to Mexico. The MI
represents a symbolic mechanism in U.S. -Mexican cooperation
against criminal organizations. In qualitative terms, MI implies
a change of perception in the bilateral relationship. On one
11
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hand, the US government acknowledges that the US has a coresponsibility in the violence that has spurred in Mexico due to
the high levels of drug consumption in the United States. On the
other hand, Mexican government also recognizes that the country
needs the help of its northern neighbor to fight against
organized crime. Thirty years ago, it would be difficult for the
Mexican government to resort to US help in security matters. In
quantitative terms, MI does not represent a significant amount
of cash since the U.S. government only compromises 1.2 billion
dollars for three years (2007-2010). This amount is low compared
to Mexican needs. However, the MI is an important advancement in
terms of bilateral cooperation, but not in a regional
perspective since Canada is not included.
Despite the progress made by the MI, some US authorities do not
trust Mexican peers due to the high levels of corruption in
Mexican police institutions. The distrust has triggered two
realities. First of all, it is very difficult to construct a
regional security community when there is this level of
distrust. Secondly, the US government has also implemented
cautious and unilateral policies towards Mexico in security
matters. For example, the US government carried out unilateral
operations such as “Casa Blanca” in 1998 and recently “Fast and
Furious.” The latter was a covert operation to identify Mexican
bank authorities that were involved in the laundering of money
coming from drug cartels. The US government imprisoned several
Mexicans and the Mexican government protested, arguing that the
sovereignty had been violated because the US authorities did not
inform Mexico about the operation. Casa Blanca also brought
distrust of Mexican officials to cooperate with the United
States in security matters. “Fast and Furious” was also a covert
operation in which U.S. authorities smuggled weapons into
Mexican territory to identify organizations that were selling
arms illegally. Again, the US did not inform Mexico about the
operation and there was protest for the unilateral actions.
In the case of border cooperation between the US and Mexico, on
22 March 2002 both countries signed the Border Partnership. In
2006, amidst rising crime on the Southwest border, ICE and CBP
worked with other Federal, State, local, and foreign partners to
establish the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST),
designed to attack TOC networks that exploit our borders and
threaten the American public. Since then, this initiative has
grown to 21 BESTs arrayed along the Southwest and Northern
borders as well as at major seaports. These BESTs have seized
more than 36,000 pounds of cocaine, 550 pounds of heroin,
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485,000 pounds of marijuana, 4,300 weapons, $68 million, and led
to the arrests of 5,910 individuals.
The U.S.-Mexico 21st
Century Border Action Plan agreements on law enforcement
cooperation still seek to finalize it.
C) Mexico-Canada
A number of authors have argued that there is not a trilateral
relationship in terms of security matters in North America
(Gabriel and Macdonald, 2007, Andreas 2003, Hristoulas, and
Roussel 2007, Clarkson, 2007). They argue that there are two
bilateral relationships: Canada and the United States and the
United States and Mexico. In both cases, Washington exerts
pressure over Mexico and Canada so its security interests
prevail in both bilateral relationships. Therefore, it is
difficult to construct a real regional security community due to
the two bilateral relationships.
Indeed, there are few bilateral actions between Mexico and
Canada in security issues. Before NAFTA was implemented,
security relations between Mexico and Canada were marginal.
There were some differences due to the nationalistic views of
each country (Benitez and Hristoulas 2012). However, after
NAFTA, Canada and Mexico were open to widening their ties in
several issues, including security. After the 9-11 events, both
countries were willing to cooperate with the United States in
its efforts against international terrorism. However, Mexico and
Canada opposed to backing up the United States in 2003 in the
United
Nations
when
Washington
was
trying
to
form
an
international coalition to attack Iraq. Both Mexico and Canada
projected
national
foreign
policies
in
this
topic.
The
reluctance of Mexico and Canada in the United Nations is also a
sign that nationalistic views impede the construction of a
security community in North America.
After 9-11 and in the light of the violence in Mexico, Canada
and Mexico have established some forms of cooperation in the
fight against crime organization. For Canada, the violence
derived from drug trafficking and the supply of drugs represent
a threat for national security. Therefore, Canada has implemented with Mexico programs to exchange information in this
topic and to train police forces (Morden, 2012). However, Canada
implemented in 2009 a visa program for Mexicans who travel to
Canada. The measure hurt the bilateral relationship and
obstructed widened security cooperation between Mexico and
Canada. This nationalistic vision of Canada has also impeded a
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deeper integration for a trilateral security community in North
America.
D) Trilateral
At the trilateral level, the three countries signed the Security
and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) in 2005. However, by early
2012, there was a consensus that the SPP failed to deliver
specific policies due to the lack of interests and incentives to
develop a broader scheme (Hristoulas 2010). While the SPP
developed working groups in the area of prosperity, the area of
security was practically absent. There was also strong criticism
in the three countries against the SPP. In Canada, the right
wing New Democrats party censured openly the SPP since they
considered it as a liberal initiative that attacked Canada’s
sovereignty. They claimed that it was their victory when, in
August 2009, the SPP website was updated to say: “The Security
and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) is no longer
an active initiative.” (NDP, 2009). In the US, there is also a
conservative movement that opposed further integration with
Mexico at all levels. For example, they deem that illegal
migrants represent a threat to US national security. Therefore,
they would oppose to a deeper integration that includes the free
movement of people in the region. In Mexico, there are also
nationalistic and leftist groups that are against a broader
integration with the United States because they consider the US
to be violating Mexico’s sovereignty regarding security issues.
The change in the presidential administrations in the United
States and in Mexico was also a factor that explains the failure
of SPP. When Barack Obama came into power, there was little
interest in Washington to deepen SPP. Due to the economic crisis
that stemmed in the US, Obama focused his attention in the
domestic economy and a deeper integration with Mexico and Canada
was put on the back burner. In Mexico, there was also a change
of presidential administration. President Felipe Calderon put
little interest in the partnership as well. At the beginning of
his government, he was very cautious towards the United States.
For example, he “de-migrated” the bilateral agenda since
previously, Fox had emphasized the migrant agreement. Besides,
Calderon did not travel officially to the US in his first year
of administration (Fox had several meetings with Bush in his
first year) and canceled the Binational Commission, a high level
cabinet mechanism to address key issues in the bilateral agenda.
Based on Calderon´s suggestion, Washington changed the US
Ambassador to Mexico in 2011, arguing that he did not trust the
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one in charge. These actions reflect some kind of anti-US
feeling from President Calderon; but he also projected a
pragmatic view towards the US. Calderon was more interested in
the Merida Initiative because it would provide funds to his
number one priority; the war against organized crime. Calderon’s
personal perceptions towards the US also buried SPP.
The failure of SPP is an example of the difficulty in creating a
trilateral security community in North America. As can be seen,
there are not enough incentives in the three countries to
develop a deeper integration in the region in security matters.
There are more obstacles to reach this goal, such as opposition
in conservative and nationalistic sectors and mutual distrust,
particularly between Mexico and the United States.
Conclusion
Due to different ideas, perceptions, principles of actions, and
policy in the three countries, a security community in North
America is difficult to construct. Up to now, we can say that
there are two security communities in the region: Canada-United
States and Mexico-United States. The first one has been more
developed,
but
the
second
one
has
several
obstacles.
Conservative standpoints in the US political system and the
distrust that the US government has in Mexican institutions that
are in charge of security issues will stand as major obstacles
for the construction of a broader cooperation scheme between the
US and Mexico. On the other hand, a nationalistic Mexican
foreign policy stand and the Mexican distrust against the US
authorities will also obstruct the creation of a security
community in the near future. Therefore, a trilateral system
would be very difficult to reach.
It is important that the three countries increase security
cooperation since all threats affect the three countries. They
need to overcome differences in ideas and perceptions and work
more coordinately to address mutual problems. For the sake of
the three societies, each government needs to cooperate in a
mandatory way. However, in the near future we will not see a
well-shaped security community in North America. It is very
likely that integration will continue to focus on trade and
financial topics, and other topics, such as migration, will not
be included in the regional agenda.
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